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Abstract
In many European countries the growth of the real GDP
per capita has been linear since 1950. An explanation for this
linearity is still missing. We propose that in artificial intelligence
we may find models for a linear growth of performance. We also
discuss possible consequences of the fact that in systems with
linear growth the percentage growth goes to zero.
In Babylonia the real GDP per capita has shown a linear growth from 1950
up to now (2015), as in practically all European countries (up to fluctuations)
[1,2,3,4,5]. In the USA growth has indeed been exponential, but this is due
to the exponential growth of the population: More people eat more and work
more. There, the real per capita GDP has grown linearly, too. Of course, linear
growth may break down due to a particular incidence, as it happened to Russia
in 1989.
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Figure 1: Growth of real GDP per capita in Babylonia (in multiples of the GDP
in 1950)
How could such a linear growth process start? And what is the mechanism
behind it?
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For a physicist, among all possible types of lines - exponential, logarithmic,
logistic, wavelike, chaotic, stochastic - a straight line is indeed something very
special and thus calls for an explanation.
So far I don’t know any answer to this question. Some economists say that it is
exponential but the second term is so small that we don’t see it yet; others say
that this linearity is purely accidental; still others say that linear growth cannot
occur, so we need not talk about it.
Sure, there are systems with an exponential growth: compound interest, bac-
teria in a Petri dish, Moore’s Law; others start with an exponential growth
and then run into saturation (logistic growth): the number of Gothic cathedrals
in Europe, the number of burned witches in Scotland, and the CO2 concen-
tration in the atmosphere [6,7,8,11]. These two types are related to mathem-
atical models: The equation dB/dt = α · B leads to exponential growth, and
dB/dt = α · B − β · B2 leads to logistic growth (with α and β system specific
parameters).
For a linear growth we may take the bathtub as an example, with a constant
flow of water, which could be modeled by the equation dB/dt = α . However,
I find it hard to believe that economy could be seen as a system just nourished
by a constant flow of something.
Something more sophisticated may be needed for an explanation. An example
is the use of thermodynamic models in economics, but as far as I know also this
approach cannot reproduce a linear growth of the GDP.
However, in artificial intelligence one could possibly meet systems with such a
behaviour, like in some Pseudo-Monte-Carlo systems. Here, in a complex learn-
ing system, at a random spot some change is applied, and if the performance
of the system is increased the change will be kept, otherwise it will be reversed;
and this proceedure will be repeated at some other spot etc. In such a system
the performance may grow linearly.
This could serve as a possible model for economics: For instance, at some spot
an engineer modifies a diesel engine, and if this leads to a better performance the
modification will be kept; or if a company brings to market a visual telephone,
and this turns out to be a flop, then the company will stop producing these
devices. (Later on the idea of a visual telephone may successfully be implemen-
ted in a different way.) Actually, if progress in economy is based on many single
logistic processes taking place in time, the sum of these may have a linear line
as an evelope; but this is purely speculative.
In artificial intelligence there are other processes which are linear in time. In
“sane” artificial evolution the pragmatic information grows linearly in time (up
to fluctuations), but in this case the information is the logarithm of the per-
formance which itself is exponential. Now we could turn the argument around
and say that there is some economic quantitiy X which grows exponentially,
and the GDP is just its logarithm. However, this would somehow contradict
the fact that the pragmatic information contained in a quantity of money is
proportional to its logarithm [11].
Let us now consider more closely some systems with logistic growth [6,7,8]. The
construction of Gothic cathedrals is an example. In those times the population
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in the cities was growing very fast, so there was a need for larger churches,
and we may call this a technical reason for growth. On the other hand, Gothic
cathedrals were in fashion, which can be seen as a “cultural program”, a term
which (in this context) has been coined by Cesare Marchetti.
In the case of burning witches we can hardly speak of a technical process, because
at that time the technology of stakes was well developed; so this seems to have
been a purely cultural program. (See also [9].)
It is often difficult to distinguish between technical and cultural processes. Con-
sider for example Moore’s Law which says that the number of transistors on a
chip doubles every 18 months. Thus the relative growth rate is a constant lead-
ing to an exponential growth. Is this a technical or a cultural process? At
first we may say that there are technical reasons for this growth behaviour, like
the development of technology or the money available for R&D; but we may
also suspect that it is a cultural program or even a cultural pressure such that
the protagonists - physicists, engineers, managers - act in a way to fulfill the
program.
In the case of GDP growth we are faced with the same question: Is there
a technical reason for linear growth, or is this a cultural process such that the
protagonists - engineers, managers, politicians, jurists - act in a way to fulfill the
program of linear growth? In the latter case we may say that somewhere there
is some kind of information in the system which is preserved and determines
the process.
Another amazing fact is that economic growth has been remarkably stable
against the political direction of the government, against the social policy,
against several tax reforms, against the distribution of wealth, against external
disturbances (the influence of the two oil crises, e.g., was very small indeed),
with the gobalisation, with innovations like the internet, etc.
An unavoidable consequence of linear growth is that the relative growth rate
itself decreases. Clearly if B grows linearly, B = α·t , the growth rate dB/dt = α
is a constant, the relative growth rate r = 1/B ·dB/dt = 1/(α · t) ·α goes to zero
like 1/t , and the same of course applies to the percentage growth rate which is
just g = 100 · r. So, for instance, globalization did not lead to a faster growth
of economy; but we cannot exclude that it was a measure to keep the slope α
of growth constant.
Thus, whereas in the decade from 1950 to 1960 the GDP increased by 100 %,
the percentage growth went down to an increase of 17 % between 2000 and
2010, corresponding to an average annual percentage growth rate of 1.7 %;
now, in 2015, the percentage growth rate is reported to be around 1.3 % (with
fluctuations, of course).
In the seventies people thought that a stable economy without growth was
not possible. Now we have an experimental proof that a (nearly) steady-state
economy is indeed possible (unless you claim that it is not stable).
Is there a connection between the growth rate and the level of interest? And is
the presently low interest rate necessarily smaller than the percentage growth
rate? We may assume that interest can only be generated by a surplus in the
production. Then it cannot be larger than the growth rate of economy. Actually
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we see that the interest produced by a life insurance can no longer reach values
of 4% or larger; and one of the problems connected to the Euro Stability Pact
may be due to the assumption that the percentage growth rate of the debts may
achieve up to g = 3% (a number connected to the Holy Trinity), whereas now
the percentage growth rate of the GDP has become much smaller. So we might
suspect that the decline of the relative growth rate like g ∼ 1/t was not taken
into account when the Euro Stability Pact was closed. We also have to keep
this in mind when talking about the crisis connected to Greece, and the interest
rates they have to pay for their debts.
Finally we may ask why investigations remain low in spite of the fact that loans
are cheap. Could it be that also industry does not believe in a larger growth
rate in demand? And how could we possibly start a new cycle of growth (linear
or other)? Or is this unnessecary?
Remark: Some if these questions have already been discussed in references
[10,11].
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